CHINO MINE TAILINGS DISCLOSURE REPORT

JUNE 2026

FREEPORT-MCMORAN

Table of Contents

Summary of FCX's Approach to Tailings Management 3

Evolution of FCX's Tailings Management System and Implementation of the Tailings Standard 4

1.0 Our TMS 4

1.1 TSF Lifecycle 5

1.2 Governance Framework 6

1.3 Risk Informed Decision Making 8

1.3.1 TSF Risk Assessment and Consequence Classification 8

1.3.2 Risk Management 9

1.3.3 Surveillance and Review 10

1.4 Approach to TSF Safety Performance Reviews 10

2.0 Chino Mine TSFs 11

2.1 Description of the Chino Mine, Mill, and TSFs 11

Table 1. Chino TSFs 12

2.2 Tailings Facility Design 13

Table 2. Select Design Information for Chino TSFs as of December 31, 2025 15

2.3 Risk Assessment, Impact Assessment, and Consequence Classification 16

Table 3: Credible Failure Scenarios (Modes and Consequences) as of December 2025 17

2.4 Emergency Response Plan 18

2.5 Dates of Most Recent and Next Independent Reviews 18

2.6 Material Findings from TSF Safety Performance Reviews at Chino and Mitigations to Reach ALARP 18

Table 4. Summary of Material Findings from TSF Safety Performance Reviews 19

2.7 Material Findings of Annual Performance Review of Environmental and Social Monitoring Programs 20

2.8 Adequate Financial Capacity 21

CAUTIONARY STATEMENT 22

Appendix: Consequence of Failure Classification Flowchart for Population at Risk 23

Other Metrics 24

Likelihood Consequence 25

ANNEX 1: Acronym Definitions 26

Introduction

Freeport-McMoRan Inc. (FCX) is committed to transparency by ensuring relevant information regarding Tailings Storage Facilities (TSFs) at our operations is available through public disclosures and active engagement with stakeholders.

This report supports our efforts to publish and regularly update information on TSF management, implementation of our tailings governance framework, our policies, standards and approaches to the planning, design, construction, operation, monitoring, maintenance, closure and post-closure of tailings facilities in alignment with the Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management (Tailings Standard)[1] Requirement 15.1. It also supports our commitment to annually publish and update information on applicable TSFs in alignment with Tailings Standard Requirement 15.1B.

Summary of FCX's Approach to Tailings Management

Effective and responsible tailings management is critical to mining safely, protecting people and the environment, and earning and maintaining the trust of the communities and stakeholders where we operate. We strive to continuously manage, enhance and innovate our tailings management systems to minimize impacts on stakeholders and the environment. Recognizing that the failure of a TSF at any of our mining operations could cause severe harm, we operate with a bias for action by using appropriate management approaches and technologies to identify and address issues quickly to prevent and mitigate potential impacts at our TSFs. Our objective remains zero fatalities, zero catastrophic failures, and zero unplanned discharges. This objective is supported by robust governance and clear accountability.

Our **Tailings Management Policy** defines our continued commitment to the safe, responsible and effective management of TSFs across all sites and includes our commitment to implement the Tailings Standard at applicable TSFs. This policy is implemented in conjunction with our **Environmental**, **Human Rights**, and **Social Performance** policies and associated management systems. We are committed to providing the financial and technical resources necessary to maintain the safety and integrity of our tailings facilities.

Risk Informed Decision Making (RIDM) underpins our approach to tailings management. We conduct risk analyses and strengthen controls to minimize residual risks to as low as reasonably practicable, applying this discipline throughout the lifecycle of each TSF, from design and construction through operation and post-closure. Figure 1 depicts the safeguards incorporated in FCX's tailings management system, which is underpinned by RIDM.

Figure 1. FCX Tailings Management System Safeguards.

[1] The Tailings Standard was established by the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), the United Nations Environment Program, and Principles for Responsible Investment.

Evolution of FCX's Tailings Management System and Implementation of the Tailings Standard

FCX established a tailings stewardship program more than 20 years ago, and it has evolved into a comprehensive Tailings Management System (TMS) that incorporates applicable regulations and international best practices, including the integration of the Tailings Standard.

Through the TMS, we promote continuous improvement at our TSFs. We systematically analyze potential failure modes, then work to eliminate or mitigate them to minimize the risk of failure scenarios associated with our TSFs.

FCX's TSFs are designed and managed throughout their lifecycles using an RIDM approach with precautionary or performance-based design approaches identified by each site's Engineer of Record (EoR) along with detailed inspections by the FCX Tailings Stewardship Team (TST) third-party reviewers, and reviews by the Independent Tailings Review Board (ITRB). Our sites' EoRs design new TSFs and analyze existing TSFs using the stringent criteria for earthquakes and floods, applicable to Extreme TSFs, regardless of actual consequence.

In accordance with the Tailings Standard, FCX's consequence classification approach incorporates each TSF's detailed information and analysis that has been enhanced over the years to reduce uncertainties and incorporate expert opinions on thresholds for Credible Failure Modes (CFMs). Our approach is derived from the Tailings Standard, and we take a conservative approach to consequences where there is a potential Population at Risk (see Section 1.3 and the Appendix for more information). For closed sites where no material risks remain, a "safe closure" designation is assigned, as described in Section 1.1.

In line with RIDM, we continue to conduct additional investigations, analyses, and, when necessary, enhancements of our controls or take additional actions to reduce residual risks to as low as reasonably practicable. In doing this work, we have reduced our uncertainties and increased our confidence in understanding our TSFs.

Monitoring our TSFs and striving to minimize potential risks is an ongoing process, and we plan to update our disclosures as required by the Tailings Standard.

1.0 Our Tailings Management System

FCX has comprehensive measures in place to help ensure our TSFs are designed, built, operated, closed, and monitored/maintained to minimize risk to our workforce, communities, and the environment.

The TMS comprises specific programs to address aspects of tailings planning, design, operation, maintenance, surveillance, and risk management over the TSF lifecycle. Although there is some overlap among the categories, our safeguards generally fall within four categories:

1. Engineering practices and safe designs

- We have robust stage-gate processes for engineering and design; our technical experts either manage or are embedded in projects to enhance shared knowledge and consistency in rigor and quality. In collaboration with the EoR, we conduct extensive site investigations and detailed site characterization to inform state-of-practice (or leading practice) engineering analyses and build a comprehensive knowledge base. Our EoRs design new TSFs and analyze existing TSFs using the stringent criteria for earthquakes and floods, applicable to Extreme TSFs, regardless of actual consequence.

2. Adherence to construction and operational parameters through monitoring and use of technology

- Our programs for operations, maintenance, inspections, and monitoring incorporate on-the-ground, automatically collected, and remote sensing data to enable regular analysis and internal reporting. Monitoring results are compared to established

performance criteria. Action plans are developed and tracked to completion to help verify that the TSF is operated in accordance with the design intent. Our Early Indicator Dashboard provides a mechanism to communicate performance in a timely manner to appropriate stakeholders at our sites and with our corporate leadership.

3. Multi-tiered oversight and management of change

- Our TMS includes mechanisms for internal and external reviews, including reviews by internal subject matter experts, Responsible Tailings Facility Engineers (RTFEs), EoRs, the TST, and ITRBs. See sections 1.2 and 1.4 for more information. Reporting on monitoring program results and findings from these reviews are distributed to site and corporate leadership, including the Accountable Executive (AE), to inform and drive our bias for action.
- We use a formalized management of change process to assess, control, and communicate changes that range from minor to material, as well as to handle temporary and permanent changes.

4. Adherence to practices grounded in continuous improvement and learning from past experiences, including industry failures and best practices

- We actively participate in industry technical conferences and research initiatives, apply lessons from case histories, and conduct regular operator and engineer education and training.

Our RIDM process is an example that spans all four categories of safeguards and is discussed further in Section 1.3.

Figure 2 shows the evolution of the FCX TMS and key programs that exemplify the categories discussed above.



Figure 2. Tailings Stewardship & Management: A 20-Year Evolution.

1.1 Tailings Storage Facility Lifecycle

A TSF lifecycle includes the design, construction, operation, closure, and post-closure phases. A TSF undergoes changes over its lifecycle, and these changes should be considered and managed to maintain safety and structural integrity. FCX works closely with internal and external experts, including the EoR, TST, ITRB, and TMS Implementation Assessor, for management across the full lifecycle of the TSF.

FCX provides the "Status" of our TSFs in our public disclosures as follows:

- **Development** - TSFs that have completed permitting and are in stages of design and/or construction through commissioning, prior to start of tailings deposition.
- **Active** - TSFs with tailings distribution infrastructure in place for the intent of raising dam crest.
- **Inactive** - TSFs that are not intended to receive tailings deposition in the current operating plan but have not yet implemented final closure activities.
- **Closed** - TSFs that are no longer in operation and have been closed to meet applicable design criteria, but for which safe closure under the Tailings Standard is not yet complete or confirmed.
- **Safely Closed** - TSFs that, upon collection and evaluation of additional data, have reached "Safe Closure" status as defined by the Tailings Standard; to receive this designation, TSFs require confirmation by an ITRB (and/or senior independent reviewer) and AE. A Safely Closed TSF does not pose ongoing material risk to people or the environment.

1.2 Governance Framework

We believe our programs and safeguards are effectively implemented through the promotion of open and ongoing communication throughout our organization and a bias for action.

We remain focused on the safe execution of our TMS by maintaining robust, multi-tiered governance of our tailings programs, which involves appropriately qualified personnel with clearly defined roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities. There are multiple layers of assurance we apply to all TSFs: site-level implementation, functional accountability, third-party review, and executive leadership and Board of Directors oversight as shown on Figure 3 and described as follows.



* Sites with only Inactive and/or Closed TSFs utilize a parallel structure reporting through the Chief Sustainability Officer.

** In some cases, the General Manager or Director Tailings and Water may report to a Division Vice President or President who in turn reports to the COO-President Americas.

Figure 3. Organizational Structure for Tailings Management System for Operating Sites that Facilitates Collaboration, Engagement, and Review.

Brief description of key roles in FCX's governance structure:

1. Site-Level Implementation

- **Site Tailings Management, Engineers, and Operators:** Internal team that implements the management program and regularly monitors, identifies, and addresses potential risks.
- **Responsible Tailings Facility Engineer (RTFE):** Internal engineer appointed by the AE responsible for the integrity of assigned TSFs. The RTFE provides technical expertise, manages risk, and liaises with the EoR. Corporate discipline experts provide regular support to the RTFE.
- **Engineer of Record (EoR):** External engineer who provides expert design and engineering analysis, technical support, inspection, review, and guidance to support an RTFE in achieving design intent of their assigned TSF.

2. Functional Accountability and Responsibilities

- **Accountable Executive (AE):** Chief Operating Officer (sites with active tailings operations) or Chief Sustainability Officer (sites without active tailings operations) who reports to the FCX Chief Executive Officer on tailings-related matters and is accountable for the safe management of TSFs and for minimizing the social and environmental consequences of any TSF failure.
- **Tailings and Water Director:** Oversees the RTFE's activities and has delegated responsibilities from the AE for engaging with and reviewing the site-level implementation of TMS activities.

3. Third-Party Review

- **Independent Tailings Review Board (ITRB):** Third-party, internationally known expert panels who provide independent opinions and guidance on the physical integrity, safety, and performance of TSFs and have access to corporate senior leadership. Members have decades of experience in applicable disciplines.
- **Tailings Stewardship Team (TST):** Third-party professional engineers who have not been directly involved with the design or operation of the TSFs and internal experts who inspect all TSFs, review documents and monitoring data, identify potential deficiencies, and recommend corrective actions.
- **Tailings Management System (TMS) Implementation Assessor:** External consultant with sufficient knowledge and understanding of the TMS to assess the efficacy of the TMS applied at a site-specific level, including key tasks, roles and responsibilities, and associated governance structure to support proper management and operation for maintaining TSF structural integrity.

4. Corporate Leadership and FCX Board Oversight

- **Corporate Leadership:** Leaders that participate in major decisions related to the tailings management program, including allocation of resources for TSF-related operations, initiatives, and projects.
- **Board of Directors:** Corporate governing body committed to providing active oversight and, with the Corporate Senior Leadership, the necessary financial and technical resources to maintain the safety and integrity of our tailings facilities globally, with a focus on risk management and continuous improvement. The AE regularly reports to the Corporate Responsibility Committee of the FCX Board of Directors on matters related to the tailings management, including implementation of the Tailings Standard.

1.3 Risk Informed Decision Making

Risk is a combination of the potential consequences of an event and the probability, or likelihood, of that event occurring.

FCX applies an RIDM approach throughout the full lifecycle of each TSF, from design through post-closure. RIDM allows us to make informed decisions while linking the stability performance and risk level that is acceptable for the TSF; the process includes periodic updates, so that changes in the operation and/or performance, which may alter the risk profile of a TSF, can be considered.

As part of FCX's TMS, RIDM consists of three primary elements:

1. Risk Assessment
2. Risk Management
3. Surveillance and Review

1.3.1 Tailings Storage Facility Risk Assessment and Consequence Classification

TSF risk assessments include risk identification, analysis, and evaluation used to determine which measures are, or should be, in place to eliminate or minimize risk. Outcomes also inform TSF consequence classification.

The risk assessment focuses on potential physical failures of each TSF, which may include instability, slope failures, excessive slope erosion, overtopping of the impoundment, and internal erosion. For the purposes of the assessment, FCX defines a TSF failure as the unintended loss of the structural containment where the tailings and water released could be impactful.

Other risks related to TSFs include, but are not limited to, occupational health and safety, environmental, social, economic, value chain, and other potential long-term sustainability and business risks. These risks are documented in the site's sustainability risk register; see the **FCX's 2025 Annual Report on Sustainability** for more information.

The TSF risk assessment is updated with our full stakeholder group and workshop process every three years for applicable TSFs, and approximately every six years for Safely Closed TSFs. In the interim, the risk assessment is reviewed annually by the RTFE, site engineering staff, and the EoR.

During the risk identification and analysis workshops, multidisciplinary teams including the EoR, RTFE and internal team members and additional external experts as appropriate, use available information such as TSF-specific detailed data and engineering analysis, experience from team members, case histories, and regulatory data to identify a specific chain of events that could lead to a TSF failure. The group analyzes how a failure may occur, what factors exist that make the potentially credible failure modes more or less likely (considering the site-specific knowledge base, existing controls and uncertainties), and ultimately determine which are credible failure scenarios.

Risk analysis leads to an understanding of each credible failure scenario for a TSF; a scenario comprises a CFM and an associated consequence that is technically feasible considering analysis and expert opinion on a minimum threshold of possibility of occurrence during a structured analysis process. To determine whether a failure mode and an associated scenario are credible, workshop participants use tools such as semi quantitative risk analysis to estimate the likelihood of occurrence of each potentially credible failure mode, the likelihood of an adverse structural response, and the magnitude of potential adverse consequences. The group's best-estimate conservative ranking is used for the likelihood categorization of each CFM guided by information described in the Appendix.

CFMs reflect the residual uncertainty that exists around physical conditions and controls in the TSF considering site-specific information and analyses. The resulting consequence classification is not an indication that a credible failure scenario will occur and having CFMs is not a reflection of TSF safety.

The credible failure scenarios are then used to create a TSF consequence classification, as defined by the Tailings Standard. The TSF consequence classification is based on downstream conditions and potential impacts of CFMs, including incremental losses to Populations at Risk; environmental impacts; health, social, and cultural impacts; and infrastructure and economic impacts.

One of the ways FCX integrates safety into our tailings programs is by taking a conservative approach to consequence classification (see Appendix for additional detail). Our definitions for consequence classification align with the Tailings Standard except as outlined below.

- If there is at least one permanently situated person at risk (permanent Population at Risk) – including the public, employees, or contractors – the CFM is classified as Extreme, whereas the Tailings Standard requires a Population at Risk (see Appendix) greater than 1,000 people to be classified as Extreme.
- If there is no permanent Population at Risk, but there is a transient Population at Risk (see Appendix), the minimum consequence classification is Significant.
- Other metrics (as defined in the Tailings Standard for environmental and health; social and culture; and infrastructure and economics) help further determine the consequence classification (see Appendix).

Appropriate modeling of credible failure breach flow or slump runout scenarios is used to inform our understanding of potential consequences. In accordance with the Tailings Standard, we assign a TSF a consequence classification based on the highest consequence categorization of CFMs for that TSF. The consequence classification is primarily used for communications and disclosure purposes. The TSF consequence classification is formally revisited when the risk assessment is updated.

Regardless of the TSF consequence classification, all of FCX's operating and development TSFs are designed, analyzed, and operated using Extreme loading criteria. Design criteria for Inactive, Closed, and Safely Closed TSFs are informed by the Extreme loading criteria and assigned using the as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) principle.

A risk assessment compares the outcomes of the risk analysis for existing conditions to determine if risks are within acceptable limits, whether existing risk reduction measures and controls are adequate, and what additional risk reduction measures should be considered (pursuant to the ICMM Tailings Management Good Practice Guide updated in 2025). The risk of each CFM is reviewed following the ALARP principle. In some cases, the ALARP principle may not be satisfied, and further risk reduction measures to reduce the likelihood of occurrence or the potential adverse consequences may be required.

1.3.2 Risk Management

Based on learnings from the TSF risk assessment, our expert teams use engineering and operational controls to prevent, minimize, and/or mitigate risks to meet the ALARP principle. These controls include an ongoing focus on quality engineering design, construction, and operating discipline. Controls could include a buttress or other mitigating construction activity (e.g., foundation improvements or stormwater management enhancements). Additionally, part of managing risk is engaging with our communities and external authorities to maintain a shared state of readiness through robust emergency preparedness and response planning for credible failure scenarios.

The risk assessment steps are repeated until the risk conforms to the ALARP principle and is followed by annual reviews and periodic TSF risk assessment updates.

1.3.3 Surveillance and Review

Surveillance and review in our RIDM program include activities as outlined in our Operations, Maintenance and Surveillance (OMS) Manual. Surveillance involves inspection and monitoring of the operation, structural integrity, and safety of the TSF. It consists of both qualitative and quantitative comparison of actual to expected behavior and its activities are performed by appropriately trained personnel. Review of surveillance information occurs throughout the year for each TSF and is facilitated via internal reporting.

1.4 Approach to Tailings Storage Facility Safety Performance Reviews

The TMS programs and their results are reviewed and evaluated for effectiveness regularly as part of routine operations and in focused performance reviews.

Internal and external reviews enhance confidence in safe tailings management, helping to confirm each TSF is performing in accordance with the design intent and to support informed decision making.

The following multifaceted review mechanisms are in accordance with the ICMM Tailings Management Good Practice Guide and satisfy the requirements of the Tailings Standard.

- **Annual Performance Review:** Each year, all TMS activities are reviewed to evaluate overall TSF performance and documented to serve as a record of tailings analyses, design, construction, inspections, and monitoring results from the preceding year with references to supporting documentation. The review summarizes key findings and assesses the cumulative impact of activities and changes to the TSF.

  The EoR provides an overall conclusion about the performance of each TSF and provides recommendations if deviances from the design intent or good practice are found. Opportunities are identified to improve or optimize TSF performance or other TMS activities. Where material changes have occurred, recommendations are made to update the design basis, performance objectives and monitoring criteria, or other OMS activities as relevant. Actions taken to address recommendations not resolved by the end of the previous reporting period are summarized in the following year's annual performance review.

- **TST Inspection:** This inspection is a review of TSFs and supporting infrastructure with a focus on TSF safety. The TST inspects all TSFs, identifies potentially significant deficiencies, recommends corrective actions, and reviews whether recommended actions were completed through acceptable measures. The TST performs annual inspections of all Active TSFs. Inspections of Inactive/Closed/Safely Closed TSFs occur every one to three years, depending on risk profile, status of ongoing care and maintenance programs, and progress towards safe closure.

- **ITRB Review:** The ITRB is comprised of a group of third-party experts that independently reviews and assesses design, construction, and tailings management practices for the applicable Americas TSFs. The ITRB holds periodic meetings as often as bi-annually, but no less frequently than quadrennially, for TSFs that are not Safely Closed. The ITRB meets at least every six years for Safely Closed TSFs. ITRBs review information from significant field investigations and geotechnical and hydrotechnical analyses, material maintenance activities or repairs, progress on recommendations, and otherwise provide input on technical or operational issues. The RTFE and site team work collaboratively with the EoR to develop an action plan to address each recommendation.

- **TMS Implementation Assessment:** This periodic review typically occurs approximately every four to six years, depending on several factors, and is conducted to assess the efficacy of the TMS applied at a site-specific level, including key tasks, roles and responsibilities, and associated governance structures to support proper management and operation for maintaining TSF structural integrity. The RTFE and site team develop action plans and schedules to incorporate the recommendations.

In this context, a material finding for a TSF safety performance review means that the finding would result in:

- A significant update to the TSF design and/or design criteria, operations, or monitoring system; and/or
- Activation of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP) or Emergency Response Plan (ERP) for an emergency event.

In addition to review processes with the EoR and independent reviewers, regulatory or permit-driven reviews are defined based on site- and TSF-specific factors.

2.0 Chino Mine TSFs

This report presents a summary of the 2025 Annual Tailings Management Performance Review and other pertinent information for the TSFs at the Chino Mine. The reporting period is January 1, 2025, to December 31, 2025, unless otherwise noted. This summary provides information per Tailings Standard Requirement 15.1.

2.1 Description of the Chino Mine, Mill and TSFs

This section provides a description of the Chino Mine, Mill and TSFs, including general background on the Chino Mine, history of operations, and details on the two active TSFs.

The Chino Mine is an active site located in Grant County, New Mexico. The Chino Mine is owned by Chino Mines Company (CMC), an indirect, wholly owned general partnership of FCX. Freeport-McMoRan Chino Inc. (FM Chino Inc.) holds 66.67% general partnership interest in FM CMC, and Chino Acquisition LLC (Chino Acq.) holds 33.33% general partnership interest in CMC. Both FM Chino Inc. and Chino Acq. are indirect, wholly owned subsidiaries of FCX.

The Chino Mine is an active copper open pit mine in Grant County, New Mexico located about 24 kilometers east of Silver City and about 160 kilometers northwest of Las Cruces. The Chino Mine consists of two operational areas – the Main Mine Area and the Southern Operations Area. The Main Mine Area includes the open pits, stockpiles, SX-EW plant, and the current operating mill facility (known as the Ivanhoe Concentrator). The Southern Operations Area consists of the filter plant, power plant, the mine's historic mill (known as the Hurley Concentrator) and the Chino TSFs. The Southern Operations Area is located south of the Main Mine Area, near the town of Hurley, New Mexico, off State Highway 180. The Cobre Mine, also operated by CMC, lies north of the Chino Main Mine area.

Tailings deposition at the Chino TSFs initially began in 1911 near the Hurley Concentrator, located southeast of the town site, with intermittent shutdowns due to economic changes. Over this period, tailings and water have been managed in the historical Whitewater Creek drainage, starting at the north end of the Southern Operations Area and progressing southward to the current deposition location of Tailings Dam No. 7 TSF. Tailings deposition at the Cobre Mine occurred 1968-1999.

Combined, the Chino Mine and Cobre Mine have ten TSFs. Of these, only two located at the Chino Mine are currently active (together, the Chino Active TSFs; references to TSF(s) or Chino TSF(s) in this report refer to the Chino Active TSFs) and are the focus of this report: the Tailings Dam No. 7 TSF, which is the primary TSF at the Chino Mine, and the Axiflo TSF, which is the TSF used to safely store tailings when Tailings Dam No. 7 is unavailable. All other TSFs at the Chino and Cobre Mines are considered safely closed. Figure 5 shows a closer view of the Chino Mine TSFs in the Southern Operations Area.

The Chino Active TSFs lie in the Southern Operations Area at the locations listed in Table 1. Figure 4 shows the general layout of the Chino and Cobre Mines, which generally includes the Southern Operations Area, the Main Mine Area, and the Chino Active TSFs.

The Chino Mine operations are located in a region in New Mexico characterized by a warm and semi-arid desert climate. Precipitation in this region is mainly rain, but snow can occur in the winter months. High intensity, short duration rainfall events are common in late summer and early fall.

Table 1. Chino Active TSFs

Name	Location	Status*	Description
Tailings Dam No. 7 TSF	32° 38′ 7.64″ N 108° 6′ 1.39″ W	Active	Tailings Dam No. 7 TSF is currently the main TSF supporting mill operations at the Chino Mine. Deposition at Tailings Dam No. 7 TSF commenced in 1988 and continues today. It is an upstream raise tailings facility, with crane mounted cyclone clusters used for tailings deposition.
Axiflo TSF	32° 40′ 34.99″ N 108° 6′ 46.85″ W	Active	Axiflo TSF was constructed in 1913 for use as a process water storage facility. In 2019, the dam was permitted by the state of New Mexico to formally operate as an upstream raise tailings facility. This facility is used to store tailings when Tailings Dam No. 7 TSF is unavailable.

* See Section 1.1 for description of "Status."

Figure 4. General Chino TSF Layout (January 2026)

Figure 5. Chino Mine TSFs in the Southern Operations area (December 2025)

2.2 Tailings Storage Facility Designs

This section presents a summary of the designs for the Chino TSFs, including construction means and methods through the lifecycle of each TSF. The Chino TSF designs are informed by assessment of TSF potential risk, site conditions, water management, mine plan operations, social and environmental impact studies, economic feasibility, and geotechnical evaluations. The design and operation of the Chino TSFs are regularly reassessed and updated when appropriate to reduce risk and increase robustness. The updates are based on informed decisions derived from the regularly scheduled enhancements to instrumentation and geotechnical investigation data, regular inspections, instrumentation and operational monitoring, and geotechnical performance evaluations.

The Chino TSF designs and analyses are overseen by the site's EoR. Based on available documents, the EoR's company and its predecessors have been involved with supporting the Chino TSFs since design efforts first started in the 1980s.

The main objectives for the Chino TSF designs are to:

- Provide safe, reliable tailings storage capacity throughout the TSF's life under both normal and upset operating conditions.

- Meet or exceed FCX design criteria, Tailings Standard requirements, and applicable New Mexico regulatory requirements.
- Satisfy established stability criteria for upstream-constructed embankments under static, seismic, and post-earthquake loading, including extreme (10,000-year) seismic events.
- Manage extreme hydrologic events by providing sufficient storage for the Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) from the Probable Maximum Precipitation (PMP), while maintaining residual freeboard.
- Manage impacts through seepage control, groundwater protection, and capture and reuse of process-affected water.
- Operate as closed-loop facilities with no routine discharges, relying on reclaim systems, seepage interception, and operational water management controls.
- Support monitoring, surveillance, and risk-informed decision making through instrumentation, defined action levels, and documented design assumptions.

The Tailings Dam No. 7 and Axiflo TSFs were both constructed using the upstream raise method of tailings dam construction. The starter dams for these TSFs are composed generally of compacted, local construction materials. These TSFs are constructed using crane mounted cyclones. Cyclone underflow (coarse grained tailings) piles are deposited at the upstream end of the crest and then pushed with a bulldozer to construct a coarse grained, free draining embankment shell. The cyclone overflow (finer grained tailings) is deposited into the impoundment.

The Chino Mine water circuit is primarily a closed loop, which means water used in the mining process is reused within the Chino Mine unless it is stored or evaporates from surfaces. The Chino Mine is supplemented with fresh water from external sources when water for reuse within the mining process is insufficient, or for certain mining processes that require fresh water. Groundwater interceptor well systems are in active operation at the boundaries of Tailings Dam No. 7 and Axiflo TSFs to capture seepage water from the TSFs for reuse in the Chino Mine's process water circuit. This groundwater pump-back system used to mitigate tailings seepage is a critical environmental control required by Chino's groundwater discharge permit. Stormwater conveyance and collection infrastructure are also in place at the Chino TSFs to collect and contain any contact water (stormwater falling on the TSFs) for reuse at the process facility where practicable. This system mitigates contact water from flowing off site. Non-contact stormwater is diverted around the mining facilities and returned to the natural drainage south of the Chino TSFs.

As described in Section 1, the Chino TSFs are actively monitored for performance and are periodically re-evaluated for stability.

The Closure and Close Out Plan (CCP) is updated approximately every five years for regulatory approval by the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) and the New Mexico Energy, Minerals, and Natural Resources Department – Mining and Minerals Division (MMD). The last state-approved CCP update for Chino Mine was in 2018, with the most recent update submitted to the state in 2024. The Chino Mine TSFs' CCP includes the following planned concepts:

- Reclamation of the TSFs with a cover system that limits net infiltration and a soil matrix that supports establishment of vegetation to mimic the natural local ecosystem.
- Design storm precipitation will be routed off the TSFs with the intent to minimize infiltration on the reclaimed surface. The Tailings Dam No. 7 TSF will have a lined attenuation area with a spillway on the impoundment and a series of down drains on the slopes will be constructed to convey stormwater off the TSF. The Axiflo TSF will have a cover design that limits net infiltration by routing stormwater with a central channel that leads to a spillway that conveys stormwater off the top surface. While the current closure plan stipulates that all minor storm conveyance structures be

designed at a minimum to convey the 100-year, 24-hour storm event and major storm conveyances designed for the ½ PMP, the design of the Chino TSFs are expected to be resilient to lesser frequency, larger storms such as the PMF into the closure and post closure lifecycles stages.

- Existing stormwater diversion structures around the Chino TSFs will be maintained to divert stormwater around the TSFs and into natural drainages in the post-closure stage.
- Tailings groundwater interceptor well systems and seepage collection sumps from the operating period will be maintained to monitor closure and post-closure performance of the Chino TSFs. The CCP includes a long-term water management and treatment plan for these and other impacted waters as required during the post-closure period.
- Operational infrastructure and components within the Chino TSFs' footprints will be decommissioned and removed as part of the closure process, except those that will continue to be used for maintenance of Chino TSFs in the post-closure stage.

Select design information for the Chino Active TSFs is included in Table 2.

Table 2. Select Design Information for Chino Active TSFs as of December 31, 2025

	Tailings Dam No. 7 TSF	Axiflo TSF
Primary Construction Material	Tailings	
Construction Method	Upstream	
Tailings Embankment Downstream Slope[2] (Horizontal Distance to Vertical Rise)	Average 4.5H:1V	Average 4.8H:1V
Maximum Current Embankment Height/ Elevation (meters)	70/1,670	11/1,702
Permitted Maximum Embankment Elevation[2] (meters)	1,684	1,710
Stored Tailings (million metric tons)	376[4]	3
Permitted Capacity[3], (million metric tons)	519[4]	9
Inflow Design Flood[5]	PMF	
Safety Evaluation Earthquake	1/10,000-year annual exceedance probability	

[2] The average tailings embankment downstream slope for Tailings Dam No. 7 TSF is based on a survey and an updated approach adopted in 2025 to improve consistency between measurements. Chino changed the deposition method for the Axiflo TSF during 2025 which altered the slope of its embankment.

[3] The permitted elevation and capacity are based on permit number D-505 and D-700 with the New Mexico Office of the State Engineer – Dam Safety Bureau (NMOSE-DSB) for the Tailings Dam No. 7 and Axiflo TSFs, respectively. Permitted capacity is calculated based off of permitted elevation.

[4] The material balance was updated in 2025, and based on updated assumptions, the existing and permitted storage capacities for the Tailings Dam No. 7 TSF were updated.

[5] "Probable Maximum Precipitation" (PMP) or "Probable Maximum Flood" (PMF) are terms often used to denote extreme hydrological events. The Chino TSFs' available capacity exceeds the required capacity of "Extreme" external flood design criteria referenced in the Tailings Standard and applicable regulations. FCX considered the potential impacts of climate change when evaluating robustness of designs.

2.3 Risk Assessment, Impact Assessment, and Consequence Classification

This section provides a summary of risk assessment findings for the Chino TSFs, consequence classifications, as well as a summary of impact assessments and human exposure and vulnerability to credible failure scenarios.

In accordance with the Tailings Standard, a comprehensive risk assessment for the Chino TSFs was completed in 2023 and presented to the ITRB. Our risk assessment process is described in Section 1.3.1.

Using information collected over the life of the Chino TSFs, a multi-disciplinary stakeholder group – including the RTFE, EoR, and other internal stakeholders – led by an expert risk assessment facilitator, identified 26 potentially credible failure modes related to the Chino TSFs through a series of semiquantitative risk analysis workshops.

Extensive engineering, monitoring and instrumentation, operational practices, analyses (geotechnical and hydrotechnical), and field and laboratory testing data were reviewed and utilized to analyze each potentially credible failure mode, understand how the potential failure may occur, what factors exist that make the potential failure mode more or less likely to occur, and analyze and determine which are CFMs. Ultimately, the group determined that there were eight CFMs among the Chino TSFs during the risk assessment process.

These eight CFMs were further evaluated to assess if they could result in flow of material, also known as a credible flow failure scenario, and to establish the consequence classification for each TSF. As summarized in Table 3, the Chino TSFs have an overall consequence classification of “Significant”.

Multiple risk reduction measures were also identified and implemented. Mitigation measures, including exposing the tailings delivery line, were completed in early 2025, to reduce the risk to ALARP. Additional actions completed during the reporting period are described in Section 2.6. The last annual risk review was completed in December 2024. A comprehensive risk assessment was initiated in February of 2026. Results of the February 2026 comprehensive risk assessment are under review.

As summarized in Table 3, none of the TSFs have a CFM that could result in a flow failure and one TSF had CFMs that could lead to a slump runout. See the Appendix for the consequence classification flowchart and matrix as well as the likelihood categorization matrix.

Table 3. Credible Failure Scenarios (Modes and Consequences) as of December 2025

TSF	Credible Failure Scenario	Likelihood	Consequence	Potential Impact
Tailings Dam No. 7	Unknown weak zone within TSF leads to slope instability and slump run out.	Low	Significant	Transient personnel (see Appendix) infrequently at risk
Tailings Dam No. 7	Earthquake causes embankment instability and slump run out.	Low	Significant	Transient personnel infrequently at risk
Tailings Dam No. 7	Seepage appearing on the embankment slope or high phreatic surface leads to internal erosion and a slump run out.	Low	Significant	Transient personnel infrequently at risk
Tailings Dam No. 7	Increase in phreatic levels within TSF causes slope instability and undrained slope failure, leading to a slump run out.	Low-Moderate	Significant	Transient personnel infrequently at risk
Tailings Dam No. 7	Impoundment overfilling or improper deposition controls leads to tailings spilling down the face of the embankment resulting in release of spilled tailings off the TSF.	Moderate	Low	Environmental
Tailings Dam No. 7	Direct precipitation causes erosion rilling and cracking in embankment shell, erosion extends to tailings layer, resulting in release of eroded tailings off the TSF.	Moderate	Low	Environmental
Tailings Dam No. 7	Tailings or water pipeline on the crest ruptures and erodes the downstream embankment, resulting in release of eroded tailings downstream.	Moderate	Significant	Transient personnel infrequently at risk
Axiflo	Tailings pipeline on the crest ruptures and erodes the downstream embankment, resulting in release of eroded tailings downstream.	Low to Moderate	Significant	Transient personnel infrequently at risk

The risk assessment considered whether there are any measures needed to minimize risk to ALARP. The risk of each CFM was evaluated following the ALARP principle. Resulting actions are summarized in Section 2.6.

Potential consequences in the event of a CFM were informed by appropriate breach or slump runout models; the assessment of potential human exposure and vulnerability was most recently updated in April 2023. The term “transient personnel” used in the table above refers to infrequently present Chino employees and contractors working on the Chino Active TSFs. We aim to update this assessment when there is a material change to any of the TSFs or an update to the knowledge base, including the social and economic context characterized by the social baseline study. Possible consequences may include impacts to transient Populations at Risk working on or immediately downstream of the Chino TSFs, or reduced water quality in the Whitewater Creek.

2.4 Emergency Response Plan

The ERP is reviewed annually and is informed by the Chino TSFs risk assessment. The ERP in effect during the reporting period was reviewed and updated in 2025. The update was developed using the CFMs presented in Table 3 and associated breach or slump runout analyses where applicable; local emergency management agencies also provided input.

Chino is transitioning from a regulatory Emergency Action Plan (EAP) to a risk-informed ERP to align with industry best practices, regulations, and the Tailings Standard. A combined ERP has been developed for the Chino TSFs and has been adopted by Chino as the primary emergency planning document beginning in 2025. Discussions with the NMOSE-DSB regarding adoption of the ERP in lieu of the EAP were ongoing as of the end of 2025.

The risk assessment for the Chino TSFs did not identify CFMs that could result in off-site impacts; therefore, Chino does not require a separate Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP), which would be co-developed with local emergency management agencies and the broader community.

A tabletop exercise to test response procedures for a credible failure scenario was completed in April 2025, with participation from site personnel, the NMOSE-DSB, and local emergency management agencies. Lessons learned from the exercise are incorporated into subsequent ERP updates. Additional ERP training is conducted annually.

2.5 Dates of Most Recent and Next Independent Reviews

Per Chino OMS manual, its internal site engineers performed routine inspections during the reporting period. The RTFE and multiple levels of internal leadership, as well as the EoR, received monthly early indicator reporting for review. The AE reviewed summaries of the quarterly early indicator reporting.

The EoR conducted monthly inspections and data reviews and provided a detailed 2025 annual performance review with input from the RTFE, site engineers, and operators.

In addition, FCX's TST, led by a third-party reviewer, completed an annual inspection and data review of the Chino TSFs in May 2025. The next annual inspection is planned for June 2026.

The ITRB for the Chino TSFs is engaged in periodic reviews over the Chino TSFs' lifecycles. The most recent ITRB comprehensive review was conducted in April 2024. An update meeting occurred in October 2024, with the next comprehensive review planned for 2027.

The most recent Tailings Management System Implementation Assessment was completed in April 2023, with the next review planned for 2027.

A summary of material findings from these inspections and reviews is presented in the following section.

2.6 Material Findings from TSF Safety Performance Reviews at Chino and Mitigations to Reach ALARP

As described in Section 1.4, FCX and its subsidiaries conduct multifaceted reviews of TSF safety. Reviews consider annual performance data, observations, and documentation and provide conclusions on the overall performance of the TSFs. Reviews may result in TSF Safety Performance material[6] findings as defined in Section 1.4.

There were three new material findings identified in 2025, as described in Table 4. There were no material findings carried over from previous reporting periods. There were no activations of the ERP for any Chino TSF in 2025.

[6] As used in this report, the term "material" is based on a different definition of materiality than used in U.S. securities laws and regulations or the disclosure requirements of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Please refer to Cautionary Statement on Page 21 of this report.

Table 4. Summary of Material Findings from TSF Safety Performance Reviews

TSF	Material Finding	Impact	Action Plan	Status
Tailings Dam No. 7 and Axiflo TSF	An audit found that the Chino Met lab was reporting higher fines content than the independent laboratory, with deviations exceeding the tolerance specified in ASTM C117-18.	Out of tolerance fines contents may misrepresent the quality and characteristics of the material and may result in unrepresentative key performance indicator reporting. Misrepresentative material characteristics could present a potential performance risk if permeability is lower than design expectations.	EoR certified laboratory technicians performed an on-site audit of the Chino Met Lab and provided recommendations for testing procedures to meet ASTM standards. Chino purchased equipment based on the recommendations and met lab has updated procedures. Chino have updated the work instruction and OMS to include annual training updated by certified independent lab technicians, quarterly quality assurance testing, and periodic independent lab audits. These actions were completed.	Resolved
Tailings Dam No. 7	High turbidity in the reclaim pond led to reduced capacity or inability to operate the reclaim pond pumps and excessive sedimentation in the reclaim water tanks.	High turbidity in the reclaim pond can reduce or stop operation of the reclaim pond pumping system disrupting milling operations and limit tailings deposition. The impacts to dam performance are limited as this condition generally occurs when the pond level is low and resolves itself as the pond level increases. Short term inability to pump does not impact the overall ability of the TSF to store the design storm.	Chino is in the process of constructing two causeways and performing dredging operations between the causeways. Additionally, Chino operations is undertaking an Root Cause Analysis in 2026 and performing a review and update of operating procedures related to pond management and turbidity. As of the end of the reporting period, the causeways were about 30% complete, with expected completion by end of 2026.	In Progress
Tailings Dam No. 7	The area between Pond 6 East and West has created a cove that if not mitigated could create pond management challenges, potential increased saturation as Pond 7 is raised. The Pond 6 cove area will be backfilled with Gila conglomerate which was changed from original plan of spigotted tailings.	As the pond is raised, the RTFE and EoR identified that this area would need to be filled to avoid impacts to Pond 6 and Pond 7 operations. To reduce impacts to operations and geotechnical performance of Pond 6, the backfill was changed from spigotted tailings to dumped and dozer compacted Gila conglomerate. This approach increases the shear strength and eliminates the resaturation risk during backfilling.	Normal operations would back fill this area using whole tailings, a containment dike and decant box/pipe. To reduce impacts to operations and geotechnical performance of Pond 6, the backfill material was changed to dumped and dozer compacted Gila conglomerate. A MOC has been submitted and construction is underway.	In Progress

The Chino TSFs met the design intent and performed within expectations in 2025 based on the multifaceted dam safety reviews and the annual performance review completed by FCX and the EoR. Several operational and sustaining capital projects were ongoing or completed in 2025 to support continued safe operations.

The risk of each CFM was reviewed following the ALARP principle. The risk reduction measures that were identified through this process and that have been implemented or are ongoing, include:

- Expose and visually inspect buried pipelines to help avoid the possibility of a buried pipeline having an undetected release of tailings or water on the TSF. This work was completed in 2025. Going forward, Chino plans to perform the task of raising tailings pipelines on a regular schedule to help mitigate the possibility of undetected releases.

The successful completion of these risk reduction measures is expected to demonstrate that the Chino TSFs meet the ALARP principle and that additional planned risk reduction measures are not expected to be required. Although projects to meet the ALARP principle are complete, periodic Chino TSF risk assessment updates and annual reviews will be performed as summarized in Section 1.3.

2.7 Material Findings of Annual Performance Review of Environmental and Social Monitoring Programs

Social and environmental monitoring programs were completed and reported per company and regulatory requirements, as applicable. The Chino TSFs are subject to laws and regulations administered by the NMOSE-DSB, New Mexico Office of the State Engineer – Water Rights Division, NMED, and the MMD. Discharge Permit DP-484 was renewed and modified by NMED in 2024. DP-484 authorizes discharges from Chino's active and closed TSFs at the Chino Southern Operations Area.

FCX's Social Performance Management System (SPMS) is an internal system with the goal of driving consistent social performance, internal coordination, communication, and accountability across operations and various other functions of the business to support the process of identifying and eliminating, managing or mitigating the actual or potential social impacts of any of our activities. The SPMS monitoring program includes community-related grievances; a human rights impact assessment (last conducted for the New Mexico operations in 2018), ongoing engagement, dialogue and feedback with the community; and a social baseline study to characterize the social and economic conditions, including potential vulnerabilities and human rights issues, of the areas proximate to the Chino TSFs to provide the necessary contextual information to inform future decisions about the TSFs for the continued protection of public safety. Further, the SPMS monitoring program includes identification of social risks associated with the Chino TSFs via TSF-specific and site risk register processes. There were no material social performance findings[7] from the SPMS monitoring program in 2025.

FCX's Environmental Management System (EMS) includes monitoring and management of water, air quality, soil quality, vegetation, and wildlife, as well as waste generated by Chino. There were no material environmental findings[8] resulting from the EMS monitoring program, no material environmental changes associated with the Chino TSFs, and no material environmental impacts due to events during 2025.

[7] As used in this report, a material social performance finding is identified from social performance monitoring and reviews of aspects related to or impacted by TSFs. Material findings may be caused by a material change in the local social, economic, or environmental context (including climate) that would reasonably be expected to have a significant effect on the quality of life or stability of the local community, or any change in the business or operation (or its assets, liabilities, or capital) that would reasonably be expected to have a significant effect on the nature of the operation and/or its positive or negative effects and impacts on the local community and/or other project-affected people.

[8] As used in this report, a material environmental finding or material finding resulting from a review of environmental monitoring is information that is identified from environmental monitoring and audits of TSFs that may have a significant consequence to human health or the environment, a significant legal component or a significant operational impact.

2.8 Adequate Financial Capacity

As stated in **FCX's 2025 Annual Report on Form 10-K**, we believe we have the financial capacity to meet current estimated lifecycle costs, including estimated closure, and post-closure obligations associated with our TSFs.

CAUTIONARY STATEMENT

This report contains forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements are all statements other than statements of historical facts, such as plans, projections, expectations, targets, objectives, strategies, commitments or goals relating to TSF-related performance, operations, risks, and projects, and the underlying assumptions and estimated impacts on our business and stakeholders related thereto; future risk mitigation; our continuing commitment to safe and reliable operations; our commitment to operating our TSFs in conformance with the Tailings Standard; the anticipated benefits of the Tailings Standard, including improved tailings management practices across the industry and reduced risks to people and the environment due to TSF failures; our commitment to ensuring our TSFs meet global best practice standards for safety; our tailings management programs, standards, and practices, including with respect to engineering, inspection, and surety; closure or divestment of certain operations or TSFs, including associated costs; improvements in operating procedures and technology innovations and applications relating to tailings management; anticipated tailings production; anticipated productive lives of TSFs; post-closure liabilities; regulatory developments; and our commitment to deliver responsibly produced copper and molybdenum, including plans to implement, validate, and maintain validation of our operating sites under specific frameworks. The words "anticipates," "may," "can," "plans," "believes," "efforts," "estimates," "expects," "seeks," "strives," "goals," "strategy," "objective," "projects," "targets," "intends," "likely," "will," "should," "could," "to be," "potential," "assumptions," "guidance," "forecasts," "future," "commitments," "initiatives," "opportunities," and any similar expressions are intended to identify those assertions as forward-looking statements. Goals and expected timing to achieve goals are subject to change without notice due to a number of factors. We caution readers that forward-looking statements are not guarantees of future performance and actual results may differ materially from those anticipated, expected, projected or assumed in the forward-looking statements. Important factors that can cause our actual results to differ materially from those anticipated in the forward-looking statements include, but are not limited to, the factors described under the heading "Risk Factors" in our Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2025, filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), as updated by our subsequent filings with the SEC, and available on our website at **fcx.com**.

Many of the assumptions upon which our forward-looking statements are based are likely to change after the forward-looking statements are made. Further, we may make changes to our business plans that could affect our results. We undertake no obligation to update any forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date made, notwithstanding any changes in our assumptions, changes in business plans, actual experience, or other changes.

This report contains statements based on hypothetical scenarios and assumptions, and these statements should not be viewed as representative of current risks or forecasts of expected risks. Any third-party scenarios discussed in this report reflect the modeling assumptions and outputs of their respective authors, and their use or inclusion herein is not an endorsement of their underlying assumptions, likelihood, or probability. While certain matters discussed in this report may be significant and relevant to our investors, any significance should not be read as rising to the level of materiality for purposes of complying with the U.S. federal securities laws and regulations or the disclosure requirements of the SEC. The goals and projects described in this report are aspirational; as such, no guarantees or promises are made that these goals and projects will be met or successfully executed.

Appendix: Consequence of Failure Classification

Flowchart for Population at Risk (PAR)



Transient: seasonal cottage use, passing through on transportation routes, participating in recreational activities

Permanent: hhousehold, commercial and/or mine site work offices or facilities

Other Metrics

Consequence Classification	Incremental Losses		
	Environmental	Health, Social and Cultural	Infrastructure and Economics
Low	Minimal short-term loss or deterioration of habitat or rare and endangered species.	Minimal effects and disruption of business and livelihoods. No measurable effect on human health. No disruption of heritage, recreation, community, or cultural assets.	Low economic losses: area contains limited infrastructure or services. <US$1,000,000.
Significant	No significant loss or deterioration of habitat. Potential contamination of livestock/fauna water supply with no health effects. Process water has low potential toxicity. Tailings not potentially acid generating and have low to neutral leaching potential. Restoration possible within 1 to 5 years.	Significant disruption of business, service or social dislocation. Low likelihood of loss of regional heritage, recreation, community, or cultural assets. Low likelihood of health effects.	Losses to recreational facilities, seasonal workplaces, and infrequently used transportation routes. <US$10,000,000.
High	Significant loss or deterioration of critical habitat or rare and endangered species. Potential contamination of livestock/fauna water supply with no health effects. Process water moderately toxic. Low potential for acid rock drainage or metal leaching effects of released tailings. Potential area of impact 10-20 square kilometers. Restoration possible but difficult and could take > 5 years.	500-1,000 people affected by disruption of business, services, or social dislocation. Disruption of regional heritage, recreation, community, or cultural assets. Potential for short-term human health effects.	High economic losses affecting infrastructure, public transportation, commercial facilities or employment. Moderate relocation/compensation to communities. <US$100,000,000.
Very High	Major loss or deterioration of critical habitat or rare and endangered species. Process water is highly toxic. High potential for acid rock drainage or metal leaching effects from re-leased tailings. Potential area of impact is >20 square kilometers. Restoration or compensation possible but difficult and requires a long time (5-20 years).	1,000 people affected by disruption of business, services, or social dislocation for more than one year. Significant loss of national heritage, community, or cultural assets. Potential for significant long-term human health effects.	Very high economic losses affecting important infrastructure or services (e.g. highway, industrial facility, storage facilities for dangerous substances) or employment. High relocation/compensation to communities. <US$1,000,000,000.
Extreme	Catastrophic loss of critical habitat or rare and endangered species. Process water is highly toxic. Very high potential for acid rock drainage or metal leaching effects from released tailings. Potential area of impact >20 square kilometers. Restoration or compensation in kind impossible or requires a long time (>20 years).	5,000 people affected by disruption of business, services, or social dislocation for years. Significant national heritage or community facilities or cultural assets destroyed. Potential for severe and/or long-term human health effects.	Extreme economic losses affecting critical infrastructure or services (e.g. hospital, major industrial complex, major storage facilities for dangerous substances) or employment. Very high relocation/compensation to communities and very high social readjustment costs. >US$1,000,000,000.

Likelihood Categorization

Failure Likelihood Categories	
Likelihood	**Description**
Very High	There is direct evidence or substantial indirect evidence to suggest it has initiated or is likely to occur in the near future. The annual failure likelihood is more frequent than 1/1,000.
High	The fundamental condition or defect is known to exist; indirect evidence suggests it is plausible; and key evidence is weighted more heavily toward more likely than less likely. The annual failure likelihood is between 1/1,000 and 1/10,000.
Moderate	The fundamental condition of defect is known to exist; indirect evidence suggests it is plausible; and key evidence is weighted more heavily toward less likely than more likely. The annual failure likelihood is between 1/10,000 and 1/100,000.
Low	The possibility cannot be ruled out, but there is no compelling evidence to suggest it has occurred or that a condition or flaw exists that could lead to initiation. The annual failure likelihood is between 1/100,000 and 1/1,000,000.
Remote	Several events must occur concurrently or in series to cause failure, and most, if not all, have negligible likeli-hood such that failure likelihood is negligible. The annual failure likelihood is more remote than 1/1,000,000.

US Army Corps of Engineers and US Bureau of Reclamation. Best Practices in Dam and Levee Safety Risk Analysis. Version 4.0, July 2019.

ANNEX 1: Acronym Definitions

AE	Accountable Executive
ALARP	As Low As Reasonably Practicable
CCP	Closure and Close Out Plan
CFM	Credible Failure Mode
CMC	Chino Mines Company
EoR	Engineer of Record
EAP	Emergency Action Plan
EMS	Environmental Management System
EPRP	Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan
ERP	Emergency Response Plan
FCX	Freeport-McMoRan Inc.
ICMM	International Council on Mining and Metals
ITRB	Independent Tailings Review Board
MMD	Mining and Minerals Division
NMED	New Mexico Environment Department
NMOSE-DSB	New Mexico Office of the State Engineer – Dam Safety Bureau
OMS	Operations, Maintenance and Surveillance
PMF	Probable Maximum Flood
PMP	Probable Maximum Precipitation
RIDM	Risk Informed Decision Making
RTFE	Responsible Tailings Facility Engineer
SPMS	Social Performance Management System
Tailings Standard	Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management
TMS	Tailings Management System
TSF	Tailings Storage Facility
TST	Tailings Stewardship Team

END OF THE DOCUMENT